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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CRIME OF ASSOCIATING WITH
CRIMINALS? AN ARGUMENT FOR
EXTENDING THE REVES "OPERATION OR
MANAGEMENT" TEST TO RICO
CONSPIRACY
SARAH BAUMGARTEL*
This Article considers the application of the "operation or management"
test under § 1962(c) of RICO, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reves v.
Ernst & Young, to RICO conspiracy. Such an application best accords
with the text and legislative intent of the RICO statute, and with
fundamental principles of conspiracy law. Furthermore,the application of
the Reves test to RICO conspiracyis appropriateregardlessof the Supreme
Court's expansive interpretation of RICO conspiracy in Salinas v. United
States, because this extension represents an essential means of giving
content to RICO conspiracy and ensuring that it is not reduced to a mere
associationaloffense.
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he interpretation of the conspiracy provision presents the recurring theme of RICO
jurisprudence: to interpret the statute to its full breadth in order to encompass the
congressional goal of convicting insulated ring leaders runs the risk of expanding the
net so wide that unintended fringe actors are also brought within the purview of
RICO.1

* Member of the New York State Bar. A.B., Duke University, 2001; J.D., Harvard
University, 2004. The author would like to thank Josh Kelner, Chris Monsour, and Nels
Peterson for their helpful comments.
1 United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986).
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When the Supreme Court announced the "operation or management
test" in Reves v. Ernst & Young 2 in 1993, requiring that individuals control
or manage an enterprise in order to be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it
represented a significant breakthrough in that it was the first time the Court
instituted any broad-stroke restriction on the application of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) since its 1970 inception.
While many thought the decision heralded an end to the liability of socalled "outsiders," including lawyers, accountants, and various other
professionals sometimes pulled into RICO suits, 3 many commentators

argued that its effects would be narrow and would not extend beyond the
specific facts of the particular case.4
Since the test was initially announced, questions concerning its proper
application have persisted, and the Supreme Court has declined to clarify
the intended reach or specifics of the standard. One particularly troubling
question concerns the application of the Reves test when the charge is not
directly under § 1962(c), but rather involves an allegation of conspiracy to
violate § 1962(c), criminalized under § 1962(d), commonly known as RICO
conspiracy.
Although many circuits have considered this question, most have
failed to do so in a thorough or convincing way, preferring to repeat the
shibboleths of conspiracy law rather than engage in a close and meaningful
analysis of the text and legislative history of RICO.
Lower courts'
confused efforts on this front have been further complicated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Salinas v. United States,6 which seemed to imply only
the slightest limits on RICO conspiracy.
Contrary to the rulings of most circuit courts that consider this issue,
and even in light of the Salinas decision, a searching analysis of RICO, the
Reves standard, and traditional conspiracy law makes clear that the Reves
"operation or management" test should be extended to apply to RICO
conspiracy cases prosecuted under § 1962(d). This extension is necessary
to effectuate the congressionally-intended limit on RICO liability explicated
in Reves and to ensure that outsiders otherwise exempt from the statute are
not simply swept back in by a broad construction of RICO conspiracy. In
addition, such an extension best accords with the important criminal justice
2

507 U.S. 170 (1993).

3 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Limits Use ofRacketeering Law, WASH.

POST,

Mar. 4, 1993, at Al.
4 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Shapiro, Attorney Liability Under RICO § 1962(c) After Reves
v.

Ernst & Young, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1153, 1162 (1994).
5 See infra Section IV.B.
6 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
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goals of RICO, while at the same time comporting with substantive and
procedural fairness for potential defendants.
Section II of this Article will describe the history of RICO and the
elements that constitute the statutory offense. Section III will relate the
development of the "operation or management" test adopted by Reves,
including its formulation in the lower courts and the eventual decision by
the Supreme Court. Finally, Section IV will consider the interaction of
Reves and § 1962(d), RICO conspiracy, both before and after the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Salinas v. United States, which interpreted the
scope of RICO conspiracy. This section will argue that even in light of the
broad standard of RICO conspiracy enunciated by Salinas, courts should
require that defendants agree to operate or manage an enterprise in order to
incur liability to effectuate the important aims of Reves and ensure that
RICO conspiracy does not become merely an associational offense.

II. THE ORIGINS AND ELEMENTS OF RICO
A. THE HISTORY OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act as Title IX of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act.7 The ostensible
purpose of RICO was the eradication of organized crime. 8 The law evolved
from recommendations to Congress by the 1967 President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, also known as the
Katzenbach Commission. 9 The Commission report evinced particular
concern with traditional organized crime, including crime families like La
Cosa Nostra, and their illegal activities, including gambling, loan sharking,
and drug dealing.' 0
Beyond wholly illegal activities, however, the
Commission noted great concern with the infiltration of legitimate

7 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970).
8

id.

9 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,Parts I & II, 87 COLUM.

L. REV. 661, 666-67 (1987) (detailing RICO's legislative history). For a considerably more
thorough look at RICO's legislative history than that offered here, with competing claims as
to its proper interpretation, see G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982); Michael
Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 774, 776-86 (1988).
10Lynch, supra note 9, at 668-69.
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businesses by organized crime syndicates," resulting in corruption across a
diverse field of professions.
As a result of the Commission's work and findings, in 1968, Senator
Roman Hruska introduced two bills that would eventually evolve into
RICO.12 Although Congress took no immediate action on his proposed
legislation, the following year, Senator John L. McClellan introduced
another major bill seeking to act on the Commission's suggestions. 13 Just
as the Commission had done, Senator McClellan emphasized the evils of
organized crime and the dangers of their corrupting effects on legitimate
businesses.' 4 Senator Hruska, in turn, introduced a new bill tracking the
15
initiative of his first two, entitled the "Criminal Activities Profits Act."'
The bill was "aimed specifically at racketeer infiltration of legitimate
business."'' 6 In response to Congressional hearings, debate, and analysis,
Senators Hruska and McClellan next joined together and introduced a
modified version of Hruska's new bill, entitled the "Corrupt Organizations
Act of 1969."'"
With slight modification, this legislative plan was
embodied in Senate Bill 1861, which was ultimately enacted as Title IX of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, RICO.18

The stated purpose of RICO is to combat "organized crime... by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime."' 19 Thus, while general congressional priorities in enacting
the legislation seem clear, there is some confusion about the specific
intended breadth of RICO and the actual means by which RICO was meant
to effectuate its ends.20 Regardless, many commentators and judges alike
agree that the application of RICO today has been stretched far beyond the
11Id. at 682 (arguing this concern extended to § 1962(c) specifically); see also Blakey,
supra note 9, at 252-53.
12See Lynch, supra note 9, at 673.
13 Id. at 675.
14 Id.

15 Id. at 676.
16 Id.

17 Id. at 676-77.
18 Id.

19Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
20 Compare Lynch, supra note 9, at 664 (rejecting the suggestion that the statute
originally intended to encompass traditional white collar crimes), with Blakey, supra note 9,
at 279-80 (concluding that Congress intended wide use of civil and criminal RICO
prosecutions, not limited in application to areas involving racketeering as such, organized
crime, or antitrust). The two commentators similarly disagree as to whether RICO was
intended to be a new substantive body of criminal law or merely a penalty enhancer.
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specific considerations of the enacting Congress, especially where civil

suits are involved. 2' Today, RICO reaches past the prosecution of
organized crime to encompass what might otherwise be categorized as
everyday business fraud, securities violations, political corruption, and
various other white collar crimes. In fact, while organized crime, criminal
infiltrations of legitimate businesses, and antitrust violations were clearly
the focus of the congressional debate, the Supreme Court has bound RICO
only by its expansive language, employing its broad terms and so-called
liberal construction clause to continually knock down limiting constructions
that lower courts have sought to impose on the statute.22 Thus, the Reves

"operation or management" test is particularly significant, because it marks
one of the only limitations the Court has placed on a broad reading of the
text, despite the repeated efforts of lower courts and litigants.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF A RICO OFFENSE
RICO comprises 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. The substantive provisions of

the statute, §§ 1962(a)-(c), criminalize conduct committed, in conjunction
23
with an enterprise, that constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
Under the statute, then, the elements of a RICO violation include (1) the

presence of a defendant "person," (2) an "enterprise," (3) and a "pattern" of
(4) specifically defined predicate "racketeering" acts.24
First, "person" is defined as "any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 2 5 "Enterprise," in turn, is
defined to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

21 See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting expanded application of civil RICO); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, PartsIII & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 924 (1987) (describing
varied uses of RICO today, despite arguably specific congressional focus); Ilene H. Nagel &
Sheldon J. Plager, RICO, Past and Future: Some Observations and Conclusions, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 456, 457-58 (1983) (summarizing categories of objections to expanding RICO
suits); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 165, 194, 250-51 (1980) (arguing the legislative history supports a much more limited
reading, especially with respect to § 1962(d), than RICO is afforded today).
22 See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (ruling that the defendant need not
personally agree to commit any predicate acts to be found guilty of RICO conspiracy);
Sedima S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 482 (rejecting the requirement of "racketeering injury" for
RICO suit); Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 606
(1985) (holding that civil RICO injury need not be a direct result of predicate act for
standing); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (defining RICO "enterprises"
to include wholly illegitimate organizations).
23 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 (a)-(c) (2000).
24 See id. § 1962.
25 Id. § 1961(3).
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other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity. 26 In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme
Court explicitly ruled that this definition was intended to encompass wholly
illegitimate enterprises, such as criminal gangs, along with more traditional
organizations, such as businesses.2 7
Next, the term "pattern" is defined, in relevant part, as "at least two
acts of racketeering activity... the last of which occurred within ten
years... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 28 The
Supreme Court elaborated on this definition in its seminal case, HJ Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., describing both open and closed patterns
of racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy the statute. 29
Finally, predicate "racketeering activity" is defined to include a litany
of generic state law crimes (such as murder, bribery, and extortion) and
specifically enumerated federal law offenses (including, for example, mail
and wire fraud).3 °
If each RICO element can be established, as defined above, an
individual can be either criminally 31 or civilly 32 liable in four different
ways. First, § 1962(a) bars a person from investing income obtained from a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.33 Second,
§ 1962(b) prohibits acquiring an interest in an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity. 34 Section 1962(c), the focus of this Article,
prohibits a person from conducting an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, stating in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise.., to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
35
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.,
Finally, in addition to the substantive provisions of RICO, § 1962(d) states,
"It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to3 6 violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

26 Id. § 1961(4).
27 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593.
28 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
29

See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1989).

30 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A)-(G).

31See id. § 1963. Penalties for criminal RICO violations include up to twenty years in
prison, fines, and expansive forfeiture of related assets.
32 See id. § 1964(c).
13 See id. § 1962(a).
" See id. § 1962(b).
15 Id. § 1962(c).
36 Id. § 1962(d).
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVES "OPERATION OR MANAGEMENT"
TEST
As mentioned, despite the purportedly specific aims of Congress in
enacting RICO, the Supreme Court has stubbornly resisted limitations
imposed by lower courts on its expansive wording. 3 The most important
and notable exception to this trend is the Court's recognition in Reves of an
"operation or management" test for liability under § 1962(c).38 In short,
that decision reads the text and legislative history of § 1962(c) to require
that an individual have "some part in directing [the enterprise's] affairs" to
be culpable for a RICO violation under § 1962(c).3 9 While this marked a
monumental and important decision in placing some limit on RICO
liability, the Court did not elaborate on the reach of its opinion. It gave
lower courts little guidance as to how the Reves "operation or management"
test was to be applied, leaving open the question of precisely what degree of
involvement or participation was necessary to find liability. In addition, the
Court failed to address the implications of this test for liability under
§ 1962(d), RICO conspiracy.
In determining the reach and application of Reves-and in support of
the ultimate conclusion that Reves was intended to extend to RICO
conspiracy-it is useful to track its development in the lower courts, to gain
a better understanding of the context and history of the ruling.
A. BENNETT V. BERG: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S PIONEERING STANDARD
The so-called "operation or management" test ultimately adopted by
the Supreme Court in Reves was first enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in
Bennett v. Berg.40 The case involved a civil RICO suit, predicated on
allegations of mail fraud, brought by former residents of the John Knox
Village Retirement Community against the founder of the community, the
not-for-profit organization that owned the community, related corporations,
certain officers and directors therein, and former attorneys and accountants
of the parties.41
Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit adopted an earlier
panel's partial reversal of the district court's dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).4 2 The en banc court generally endorsed the
earlier panel's decision, but made special note of their concerns regarding

37 See supra note 22.
38

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 182 (1993).

"9 Id. at 179.
40

41
42

710 F.2d 1361, 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
Id. at 1363.

See id. at 1364.
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the sufficiency of the § 1962(c) RICO claim.43 Drawing on a Fourth Circuit
decision, United States v. Mandel,44 the court noted that the plaintiffs
complaint might be defective for failing to allege the necessary degree of
participation on the part of certain defendants to sustain § 1962(c)
liability. 45 According to the court:
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO, even in conjunction with a
RICO enterprise, may be insufficient to support a RICO cause of action. A
defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise,
which ordinarily will
46 require some participation in the operation or management of
the enterprise itself.

The opinion seemingly rested on a close analysis of § 1962(c)'s language.47
Notably, the court also expanded its test beyond § 1962(c) to questions of
liability under RICO conspiracy, reiterating that "a RICO conspiracy charge
alleges agreement to participatein conducting the affairs of an enterprise
through the commission of... predicate acts. 48 While not conclusive, this
implies that the court that first clearly enunciated the "operation or
management" test assumed that it would extend to questions of RICO
conspiracy liability predicated on § 1962(c) claims.
B. YELLOWBUS AND THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S "SIGNIFICANT" LIMITATION
ON LIABILITY
Although occasion to apply the "operation or management" standard
did not arise frequently in the Eighth Circuit, its analysis was incorporated
and expanded upon by the D.C. Circuit in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union.49 The court's opinion, which adopted
an even narrower view of liability under § 1962(c) than that taken by the
Eighth Circuit, stems from both the D.C. Circuit's in-depth analysis of the
language and legislative history of RICO, and the particular facts of the
case. In the case, Yellow Bus Line, Inc. alleged RICO violations against a
striking union and its trustee, James Woodward, committed in conjunction
with the union (the specified "enterprise" in the case). 50 Because the
circuit's law proscribed liability under § 1962(c) where the RICO defendant
41 See id.
44 591 F.2d 1347, 1375-76 (4th Cir. 1979).
45 Bennett, 710 F.2d at 1364.
46

Id. (emphasis added).

47 See id.

Id. (quoting United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis
added).
49 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 950.
48
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"persons" (here, the union and the trustee) and the enterprise (the union)
were actually the same entity, the court dismissed Yellow Bus's suit
directly against the union.51
In response, Yellow Bus amended its
complaint to name itself, Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., as the enterprise through
which the defendants allegedly conducted their racketeering. 52 The claim
was that by going on strike against the company, the union had committed
acts of racketeering through conduct of or participation in the company
itself, in violation of § 1962(c). 53 The D.C. Circuit was thus called upon to
determine whether Yellow Bus's innovative construction of § 1962(c) was
countenanced by the language of RICO. As the court stated, the question
"[s]imply put... is to determine the intent of Congress in using the phrase
'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the]
' '4
enterprise's affairs. , 1
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis with a summary of how other
circuits had interpreted the language of this clause.5 5 While the court
outlined the discussion of the Eighth Circuit in Bennett v. Berg, it noted that
most other circuits had opted for a broader reading of the statute 6
Specifically, the Second Circuit had adopted a broad view of RICO
liability, stating in United States v. Scotto that § 1962(c) required only that
the defendant be enabled to commit the predicate offenses by virtue of his
involvement in the affairs of the enterprise or that the predicate acts
committed by the defendant were related to the activities of the enterprise. 7
The Ninth Circuit also had adopted this test, without elaboration.5 8
Like the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit had rejected the Eighth
Circuit's limited view of liability, giving § 1962(c) a significantly broader
reading. 59 According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[t]he word 'conduct' in

51 Id. at 951.
52 Id.
53 Id.

54 Id. at 952 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 952-53; see also Catherine M. Clarkin, Reves v. Ernst & Young:
The
Elimination of Professional Liability Under RICO, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 1025, 1046 (1994)

(providing a helpful summary of the constructions of § 1962(c) employed by various circuits
pre-Reves).
57 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
58 See Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 952 n.4 (citing United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d
1522, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988)).
59 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th

Cir. 1986).
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§ 1962(c) simply means the performance of activities necessary or helpful
to the operation of the enterprise., 60 The court had opined,
The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders and outsidersthose merely "associated with" an enterprise-who participate directly and indirectly
in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....The RICO net
is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved.61

The Fourth and Seventh Circuits had specifically rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's standard, but had not clearly established their own requirements
under § 1962(c). 6 2 The Fifth Circuit, in turn, had taken a slightly more
restrained view than either the Second or Eleventh Circuits, modifying the
standard announced in United States v. Scotto. Under the Fifth Circuit's
enunciation of the test, in order to be liable under § 1962(c), the
racketeering acts must be related to the enterprise, and63 the defendant's
position in the enterprise must facilitate their commission.
Turning to its own analysis of the text and legislative history of RICO,
the D.C. Circuit ruled the Eighth Circuit's construction of the statute the
most sensible, rejecting the broad readings of both the Second and Eleventh
64
Circuits. The court in Yellow Bus emphasized that the language of RICO
seemed to limit liability to those with some ability to manage or control the
enterprise: "Congress, we stress, did not proscribe mere participationin the
enterprise's affairs.., but rather, subjected participation in the conduct of
an enterprise's affairs to RICO liability. .... 'Conduct' is synonymous with
' ' 65
management' or 'direction. ,
With this in mind, both the Second and Eleventh Circuit readings were
problematic because they effectively read the word "conduct" (which
appears twice) out of the statute by allowing liability for activities that
represented nothing beyond "participation" in an enterprise. The court
emphasized that "conduct" was the crucial term in the statute because
"conduct" meant that guidance, management, or some control over the
enterprise was required for liability.66
Furthermore, as the D.C. Circuit noted, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis
of this issue was not particularly compelling.6 7 Although the decision in

Id. at 970.
Id. (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978)).
62 See Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 953 (describing the holdings of each circuit).
63 See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1341 (5th Cir. 1983).
60

61

64Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 953-54.
65 Id. at 954.
66 Id.
67

Id. at 953.
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68
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. Touche Ross & Co.
clearly sought to ground itself in the language of the statute, the opinion
lacks any real, searching review of the text. While the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the Eighth Circuit's formulation as neglecting the "directly or
indirectly" language and therefore overly narrowing liability, the Eleventh
Circuit's construction is flawed in that it reads "conduct" out of the statute
entirely by permitting mere participation in the affairs of a given enterprise
to carry liability. 69 The D.C. Circuit specifically emphasized that its
construction, which tracked that of the Eighth Circuit, best fit the language
of the statute, rendering no term superfluous. 70 Though the D.C. Circuit did
require "significant" participation in the management or control of an
enterprise to fall under § 1962(c), it clarified that this requirement did not
prevent "outsider" liability or ignore the phrase "directly or indirectly," as
the Eleventh Circuit supposed. 71 To elaborate, the court gave the example
of an organized crime boss who "pulls the strings of a corporation through a
puppet president" as one who might indirectly conduct the affairs of an
enterprise, incurring liability under their reading of the statute.7
The D.C. Circuit went on to explain how its newly adopted standard
was faithful to the goals of RICO, as illuminated by the legislative history.7 3
Congress, the court opined, was not concerned with every petty predicate
crime, but rather with the infiltration and conduct of legitimate businesses
and whole enterprises through a pattern of such acts. 74 The precise
language of the statute, therefore, reflects important congressional priorities
concentrating on the control and management of businesses, not mere
participation in their affairs.75
In short, the D.C. Circuit responded negatively to Yellow Bus's
creative pleading attempt, concluding that the defendant union could not
possibly be liable under RICO in such an action because the union could
not have "conducted" the affairs of Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. through a strike,
as would be required by the terms of § 1962(c). 7 6 Under the court's
formulation of RICO, then, a defendant must have some significant control

68 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
69

Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 954.

See id.
71 See id.
70
72

Id. at 953.

71 See id. at 954.
74 See id.

7"See id. at 955.
76 See id. at 956.
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over the enterprise, which usually involves managing or determining the
course of the enterprise's business, in order to "conduct" that enterprise."
It is clear from the court's discussion of the effects of a different
reading of RICO on delicate labor-management legal relations that the
particular details of the case weighed heavily on the D.C. Circuit.78
Nevertheless, the court's determination of the legal standard rests on a
careful and thorough analysis of the language and legislative history of
§ 1962(c), as well as valid policy concerns that can be broadened to many
other areas of RICO jurisprudence. As the court recognized in its opinion,
circuits that had rejected a narrower reading of RICO had done so only after
a cursory review of the language, with little, if any, reference to the
legislative history.79 While the Eleventh Circuit, for example, had focused
on the "directly or indirectly" language to justify its broad interpretation, it
had failed to read that phrase in its proper context. In context, it is clear that
"participation" (whether direct or indirect) is not itself a basis for liability,
but rather that there must be "participation. .. in the conduct" of an
enterprise's affairs. 80 Similarly, in its grand, sweeping quote from United
States v. Elliott regarding the fact that RICO is designed to catch "even the
smallest fish," the Eleventh Circuit ignores large sections of the legislative
history, which emphasize finding new and creative means for getting at
mob "bosses" while not necessarily extending liability to those tangentially
81 These issues are recognized and addressed by
involved in the enterprise.
82
Bus.
the court in Yellow
Therefore, while the Supreme Court in Reves ultimately adopted the
Eighth Circuit's test and rejected what it perceived to be a much narrower
construction in Yellow Bus (due to the requirement of "significant control"
within an enterprise),8 3 it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court's decision
builds upon the Yellow Bus opinion's careful analysis of RICO's text and
legislative history.

Id. at 954.
See id. at 955.
79 See id. at 954.
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
81 Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1993) (reiterating congressional
71

78

emphasis on criminalizing the operation of criminal enterprises); United States v.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing RICO's primary purpose as
reaching previously unaccountable organized crime leaders).
82 See Yellow Bus, 913 F.2d at 953-54.
83 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 n.4.
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C. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN REVES V. ERNST& YOUNG
Three years after the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Yellow Bus and ten
years after the Eighth Circuit first established its "operation or
management" test, the Supreme Court officially adopted a version of this
84
test in Reves v. Ernst & Young.
Reves v. Ernst & Young was a case on appeal from the Eighth Circuit,
in which that circuit's "operation or management" standard for liability
under § 1962(c) of RICO had been applied. 85 The case involved a RICO
claim stemming from the mismanagement and bankruptcy of the Farmer's
Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. (the Co-op). 86 The Co-op was
organized in 1946 and managed by a twelve person Board of Directors
selected from its membership. 87 In 1952, the board named Jack White as
general manager, and he became primarily responsible for the everyday
dealings of the Co-op. 88 In order to cover its operating expenses, the Co-op
sold promissory notes payable on demand.89
Jack White oversaw several suspect financial dealings during his
tenure as manager of the Co-op. 90 Specifically, in 1980, he personally
guaranteed and authorized loans to himself that ultimately totaled around $4
million to finance the construction of a gasohol plant, White Flame Fuels,
Inc., that he had undertaken with a partner. 91 Later that year, both White
and the Co-op's longtime accountant, Gene Kuykendall, were indicted on
charges of federal tax fraud.92 They were convicted in January 1981.
In
the meantime, White engaged in litigation with the Co-op board that
resulted in a consent decree relieving White of his massive debts to the
organization, and in turn 9providing
for Co-op ownership of White Flame
4
1980.
February
in
starting
In late 1981, the Co-op hired the firm Russell Brown (which later
merged with another firm, Arthur Young & Co., and then ultimately

84 507 U.S. 170.
85

See Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991), aJfd sub

nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
86 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 172-73.
87 See Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1315.
88

Id.

89 Id.
9' See

id.

91 Id.
92

Id.

9' Id. at 1316.
94

Id. at 1315.
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became Ernst & Young) to conduct a financial audit. 95 The Arthur Young
auditors were immediately faced with the problem of how to value and treat
the White Flame plant in their financial calculations. 96 The auditors
reached the somewhat questionable conclusion that the fixed asset value of
the plant was greater than $4.5 million.9 7 In addition, the auditors decided
to account for the plant as if it had been owned by the Co-op at the start of
its construction in 1979, rather than treating it as a later purchase, made
from White as part of the consent decree. 98 The result of this decision was
that they were able to value the plant at its fixed asset value of $4.5 million,
rather than at its fair market value at the time of purchase (which would
have been between $444,000 and $1.5 million). 99 If the auditors had chosen
to value the plant at less than $1.5 million, the Co-op would have been
insolvent. 00
In April 1982, Arthur Young presented its 1981 audit to the Co-op's
Board of Directors.' 0 ' The auditors did not draw the board's attention to the
02
decisions they had made in their treatment of the White Flame plant.'
Similarly, the auditors and the board did not focus on these decisions at
their 1982 annual meeting, but instead touted the financial health of the Coop. 0 3 The same auditors were again hired to perform the Co-op's 1982
financial audit. 10 4 Once again, the White Flame plant was valued at over
$4.5 million, and it was largely responsible for the positive net worth of the
organization.'0 5
Despite the efforts of the auditors and board, the apparent financial
security of the Co-op began to diminish shortly thereafter. In early 1984,
the Co-op had a slight run on its demand notes (which together with
financing from the Cooperative Finance Association constituted its only
source of funds). 10 6 Soon after, on February 23, 1984, the Co-op finally
filed for bankruptcy.'0 7 That same month, the trustee in bankruptcy filed
suit against numerous individuals and entities, including the auditor, on
IId. at 1316.
1316-17.

96 Id. at

IId. at 1317.
98 Id.

99 Id. at 1317-18 n.7.

'O Id. at 1317.

"' Id. at 1318.
102

Id.

103 Id.

1o Id. at 1319.
toS Id. at 1320.
106 Id. at 1321.
107

Id.
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behalf of the Co-op and certain noteholders.10 8 Among the claims asserted
by the trustee was that Arthur Young (soon to become Ernst & Young) had
participated in the operation or management of the Co-op through a pattern
of racketeering activity, in violation of § 1962(c).10 9
On the RICO claim, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of Arthur Young, concluding that as a matter of law their
participation in the Co-op could not rise to the level demanded by the
circuit's "operation or management" test. 10 The court reiterated, "In
Bennett v. Berg... we addressed the nature of the participation required of
a RICO defendant before liability is appropriate [concluding] ... some

participation in the operation or management of the enterprise itself' is
necessary.1"
The auditor's participation in the enterprise, the court
continued, simply could not rise to this level, as their only involvement with
the Co-op included conducting an audit and meeting with the board and Coop members to present their findings." 12 The court commented on the split
in the circuits as to how this provision of RICO should be interpreted,
but
113
affirmed its commitment to the operation or management test.
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the suit against Arthur Young, adopting the
''operation or management" standard as the proper interpretation of RICO
§ 1962(c).' 14 Like the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court's decision centered
on the precise language of the provision. In the key phrase defining
liability under § 1962(c)-rendering it unlawful for a person employed by
or associated with an enterprise "to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs"-the Court focused
on the word "conduct" and its dictionary definition of "lead, run, manage,
or direct. ' 15 The majority emphasized that the word "conduct" must carry
some implication of management or direction, beyond mere participation in
an enterprise, or else it would be effectively read out of the statute." 16 In
addition, the Court detailed the manner in which the second "conduct" (in
the phrase "participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of') modified

108 Id.
109 Id.
1o

Id.at

111 Id.

1324.

(citation omitted).
id.
113 See id.
114 See Reves v. Emst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 186 (1993).
115 Id. at 177.
116 Id. at 178.
112
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the definition of "participate" in the context of the statute. 1 7 The Court
noted that this clause must extend liability more broadly to give it a separate
meaning from the clause directly before it, but that "conduct" nonetheless
implied a narrower scope of liability than some lower courts had allowed in
merely defining this clause in terms of "participation."1' 18 In sum, the Court
stated that the language "participate ... in the conduct," just as the word
"conduct," implied that the defendant must have some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs to sustain liability.11 9
In setting out its "operation or management" test, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it was adopting the standard of the Eighth Circuit, and not
the more restrictive construction of the D.C. Circuit.' 2" In other words,
while some level of control over the enterprise was required, the Court
refused to hold that the defendant must exercise "significant" control over
the enterprise in order to be culpable under § 1962(c). 12 1 The Court also
clarified that its rule was intended to be more functional than formal-an
individual need not be part of an enterprise's upper management or hold a
formal position within the organization in order to be guilty.122 The test
only required that the individual, whatever his title or status,
exert some
23
degree of control over the operation of the RICO enterprise. 1
In addition to the language of § 1962(c), the Court contended that its
interpretation was bolstered by the legislative history of RICO. 124 The
Court noted that the bill introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan that
would eventually become RICO stated its purpose as "prohibit[ing] the
infiltration or management of legitimate organizations by racketeering

117 See

id.

118 See id. at

179.

119 See id. Extended discussion of the dissenting opinion in Reves filed by Justice Souter,
and joined by Justice White, is omitted for the purposes of this Article. In brief, Justice
Souter concluded that the language of § 1962(c) was vague at best, meaning that RICO's
liberal construction provision should govern. See id. at 188-89 (Souter, J., dissenting). That
clause counseled for rejection of any significant limitation on RICO liability. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter further argued that Arthur Young's actions exceeded that of mere
"outside" auditor and that the company should face RICO charges for their part in the Coop's fraudulent actions. Id. at 190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 179 n.4.
121 Id.

See id. at 184-85.
See id.
124 See id. at 179-80.
12

123

While the Reves decision was seven-to-two, Justices Scalia and

Thomas specifically refused to join the section concerning the legislative history of RICO.
Id. at 172 n.l. Presumably this was at least in part due to Justice Scalia's outspoken
denouncement of reliance on conjectural interpretations of such history as a means of
judicial decision-making.
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activity.' 25 The Court also drew upon the statements of then Assistant
Attorney General Will Wilson regarding RICO's predecessor bills,
complaining that some "fail[ed] to prohibit the control or operation of such
businesses by means of prohibited racketeering activities."'' 2 6 Along the
same lines, the Court relayed that the Congress that enacted the bill
repeatedly evinced its concern with the operation or management of
enterprises through racketeering and that they consistently referred to
§ 1962(c) as "prohibiting the operationof an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering."'127 All in all, the Court amassed a convincing collection of
evidence to support the idea that Congress was considering liability for
those who managed enterprises through racketeering,
and not for those who
28
merely associated with such enterprises. 1
D. EXPLAINING THE REVES RULE
The Reves rule was drawn from an extensive inquiry into the text and
legislative history of § 1962(c), undertaken by the Supreme Court with at
least partial reliance on the analyses of the Eighth and D.C. Circuits. While
the exact contours of the test and its potential application to RICO
conspiracy were not discussed by the Supreme Court, the nature of the
opinion in Reves lays a clear groundwork for demonstrating why the
"operation or management" test must be extended to § 1962(d).
The first important, though perhaps obvious, point is that this is not a
mere court-imposed, prudential rule designed to narrow the application of
RICO (though certainly such rules have been explored). 29 Reves is a
decision on the specific legislative intent of Congress, a limitation imposed
by a Court that has consistently resisted limiting the 30statute's scope by
opting for the broadest possible reading of its language.
Next, Reves is a well-reasoned and well-supported decision
proper interpretation of § 1962(c).
Criticism of the Court's
focuses on the difficulty of applying the test or of determining the
The textual
its effects, not the propriety of its adoption.' 3'

125
126
127

as to the
decision
extent of
analysis

Id. at 181 (quoting S. 1861, 91st Cong. (1968)).
id.
See id. at 182.

128 See id. at 182-83.
129

Cf New Eng. Data Svs. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1987) (relating

pleading requirements for civil RICO suits).
130 See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
131See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst &
Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy

Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1345 (1996); Scott Paccagnini, How Low Can
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undertaken by the Court provides convincing support for the idea that some
management in an enterprise must have been intended by § 1962(c), from
the repeated use of the word "conduct" and the employment of that term to
modify the participation prong. 32 Furthermore, the Court does a good job
of reconciling its textual analysis with the legislative history, citing
numerous references and statements to suggest that § 1962(c) was aimed at
those who managed enterprises via racketeering. 133
Finally, although this was not a specific focus of the Supreme Court's
opinion, the test is also important because it accords with the policy goals
of RICO, theoretically striking the proper balance in liability by separating
those individuals intended to be swept up in the RICO net and those
intended to be spared. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Yellow Bus, the basic
goal of RICO was to eliminate the infiltration of legitimate businesses by
those associated with organized crime and racketeers; this goal means that
RICO's provisions would naturally focus on "control" of legitimate
businesses and not every petty crime or corruption associated with a given
enterprise.134 Similarly, in a highly influential opinion dealing with the
proper scope of the RICO conspiracy provision, the Seventh Circuit read
RICO-related committee notes to clearly indicate that the congressional
focus in enacting the statute was to reach "crime leaders" who were thus far
more "experienced, resourceful, and shrewd in evading and dissipating the
effects of the established procedures in law enforcement.' ' 135 Insofar as the
goal of RICO was to reach "insulated ring leaders,"'' 36 the Reves decision is
aim while preventing the net
essential in facilitating this law enforcement
37
from being cast unnecessarily broadly.'
As a final note, in exploring the Reves opinion, it is important to
recognize what the Supreme Court rejected in adopting its "operation or
You Go (Down the Ladder): The Vertical Reach of RICO, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2003)
(describing issues in determining the extent of RICO liability post-Reves).
132 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 177-78 (analyzing the phrase "to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs").
13 See id. at 179-82.
134 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, 913 F.2d
948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
135See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting S. REP.
No. 89-72, at 2 (1965)).
136

Id.

137

This argument focuses on whom the Reves line both includes and excludes. There are

many positive policy reasons, for example, for permitting some level of immunity to RICO
suits to ensure that the lawyers, accountants, and other professionals presumably not
"conducting" an enterprise, but often hired to work in conjunction with an organization, are
not constantly in fear of being pulled within RICO's wide purview. See Clarkin, supra note
56, at 1065 (discussing the benefits of excusing "outside" professionals from RICO liability).
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management" standard.
In announcing this test, the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the more liberal construction of § 1962(c) announced by
the Eleventh Circuit in Bank of America, 138 which permitted liability for
those only tangentially involved with an enterprise. 39 The implication is
that RICO was not, in fact, intended to catch even the "smallest fish." In
addition, the Court stated that aiding or abetting an enterprise would not
carry liability under § 1962(c).140 The basic thrust of the opinion is an
attempt to exempt a certain-though certainly not well defined--category
of defendants from liability, recognizing the intent of Congress to exclude
1 41
some portion of so-called "outsider" defendants from the reach of RICO.
As the Court clearly stated, "In this case it is clear that Congress did not
intend to extend RICO liability under § 1962(c) beyond those who
participate in the operation or management of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 1 42 This is directly in line with the
comments of one of RICO's original sponsors, Senator McClellan, as
related above. To quell concerns of critics, he emphasized that RICO
liability would not extend to all of those who committed racketeering
offenses, but rather only those that "engage[d] in a pattern of such
violations, and use[d] that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an
interstate business.' 4 3
IV. APPLYING REVES TO § 1962(D) RICO CONSPIRACY
In terms of the functional application of Reves thus far, lower courts
have struggled with the somewhat vague standard announced by the
Supreme Court. Courts have used the Supreme Court's pronouncement that
operation or management may extend beyond upper management to find the
Reves test met in a variety of situations. As a general rule, "outsiders," or
those merely associated with an enterprise, must play some part in the
operation or management; "insiders," in turn, must be under the direction of

138 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir.

1986).

139See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993).
140 See id. at 178-79; Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1367.
141See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183 (characterizing plaintiffs proposed liberal construction of
RICO to include non-managers, a "new purpose that Congress never intended").
142 Id.at

184.

143 Id.at 183 (quoting 116 CONGREC. S586, 18940 (statement of Sen. McClellan)).
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one who manages an enterprise. 144 However,45applying this general rule in
precise cases has sometimes proven difficult. 1
A question that has proved equally as vexing as determining the
precise scope of Reves involves whether the test was intended to apply to
liability under § 1962(d), RICO conspiracy, when predicated on an
agreement to violate the substantive § 1962(c) charge. In other words, if a
person is accused of conspiring to violate § 1962(c) by agreeing to conduct
or participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity, must the moving party also allege an agreement to
operate or manage the enterprise through such a pattern? Must the
individual defendant personally agree to manage the enterprise? Is it
sufficient that the defendant conspire with a manager, or one who otherwise
meets the Reves test? Is the test wholly inapplicable?
Before discussing the interaction of §§ 1962(c) and (d), a greater
examination of RICO conspiracy is required. While the focus of the
discussion thus far has been Reves and § 1962(c), the issue of the
interaction is equally, if not more, one that centers around the meaning and
intended reach of RICO conspiracy.
A. ABOUT RICO CONSPIRACY
Unfortunately, courts have long struggled with how to interpret the
reach of § 1962(d), which states simply that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or
Questions have focused on the nature of the
(c) of [§ 1962]. "146
conspiratorial agreement necessary to constitute a violation, as well as the
extent to which RICO conspiracy adopts traditional criminal or civil
conspiracy principles.
A seminal case explicating RICO conspiracy is United States v.
Elliott. 47 The case discusses the manner in which RICO conspiracy
dispenses with certain common law conspiracy requirements that might
otherwise inhibit the prosecution of RICO's potentially diverse criminal
undertakings together. 148 RICO accomplishes this, the court explains,
through its creation of a new and expanded conspiratorial objective, to wit,
144See generally Carrie J. Disanto, Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Supreme Court's
Enigmatic Attempt to Limit Outsider Liability Under 18 US.C. § 1962(c), 71 NOTRE DAME

L. REv. 1059, 1070-71 (1996).
145 For an exhaustive review of who is liable under § 1962(c) under each circuit's postReves construction, see Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131.
146 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000).
147571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
148 See id. at 902.
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violation of RICO provisions §§ 1962(a)-(c) through actions in conjunction
with an enterprise. 49 Although the expansive reading of RICO conspiracy

offered by Elliott has since been curtailed slightly by the Fifth Circuit and
other courts,150 it remains an important opinion in understanding the aims of
§ 1962(d).
In terms of the simple, mechanical requirements of § 1962(d),
questions generally focus on what precisely one charged with RICO
conspiracy must have done to incur liability.' 5' The basic answer to all
questions provided by the cases is that RICO conspiracy adopts background
"hornbook" criminal conspiracy laws.152 It is clear, therefore, that the
government must prove the existence of the basic RICO elements, including

a defendant person, a RICO enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering
(including two predicate acts agreed to or actually committed by some
individual) to establish liability.153 Unlike the general federal conspiracy
statute, it is also well accepted that RICO conspiracy does not require proof
of any overt act. 154 Beyond this, a defendant must merely agree to the

55
illegitimate objectives that constitute the crime.
The exact content of this agreement is where further questions arise.
There is apparent consensus that a RICO conspiracy charge must include an
intentional agreement on the part of some defendant to violate a substantive
provision of the statute; agreement merely to commit a predicate offense

would not be sufficient. 56 Coupled with this requirement is the need that
the defendant possess some degree of knowledge that the conspiratorial

141

See id. at 902-03.

1s0 See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1446-47 (explaining development of law
since Elliott).
151See, e.g., James Clann Minnis, Clarifying RICO's Conspiracy Provision: Personal
Commitment Not Required, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1399, 1407 (1988) (summarizing divergent
arguments as to the level of personal participation and the nature of agreement required for
RICO conspiracy).
152 See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997); United States v.
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 1986); Minnis, supra note 151, at 1409. This
assumption was complicated somewhat by the Supreme Court's decision in Beck v. Prupis,
which applied principles of civil conspiracy to a civil suit under § 1962(d), despite the fact
that RICO's substantive provisions are generally treated alike in civil and criminal cases.
529 U.S. 494, 504 (2000). A full exploration of the potential implications of that decision
are beyond the scope of this Article.
153 See Jeanette Cotting, RICO's Conspiracy Agreement Requirement.: A Matter of
Semantics?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 725, 749 (1993).
154 See, e.g., Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1456.
155 See Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 496.
156 See, e.g., id. at 496 n.3.
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enterprise extends beyond her own personal participation. 5 7 The difficult
question, which has divided the circuits for most of RICO's history, is
whether the defendant must personally agree to commit (or actually
1 58
commit) any predicate acts as part of the initial conspiratorial agreement.
Because the government or moving party will frequently be able to prove
numerous illegal predicate acts with respect to each defendant, hard
questions involving the extent of conspiratorial liability generally arise in
the context of smaller RICO prosecutions, when non-active ring leaders are
prosecuted, or when more outside members of an alleged conspiracythose without any direct criminal participation-are involved. 5 9
This issue was ultimately settled, for better or worse, by the Supreme
Court in its 1997 decision in Salinas v. United States.' 60 Consequently, it is
clear today that an individual need not personally agree to commit or
actually commit any predicate acts for RICO liability.' 6'

Salinas both

clarified and confused the exact reading of § 1962(d) conspiracy liability,
however, and there is still some uncertainty as to the exact proof required as
to each defendant. Nonetheless, with the basic outline of RICO conspiracy
in mind, the question of the application of Reves can be more properly
considered.
B. THE INTERACTION OF REVES AND § 1962(D) BEFORE SALINAS
The question of whether Reves would somehow influence the level or
quality of proof required to sustain RICO conspiracy when predicated on a
violation of § 1962(c) has not been specifically addressed by the Supreme
Court. Although the Eighth Circuit seemingly assumed some extension of
its "operation or management" test to RICO conspiracy-specifying that "a
RICO conspiracy charge alleges agreement to participate in conducting the

157See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1448-51.
158

For a helpful summary of the state of the law before the Supreme Court's decision in

Salinas, see Adams v. United States. 474 U.S. 971 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from the
denial of cert.). Exacerbating the difficulty in interpretation is the fact that the RICO
conspiracy provision is barely discussed in the legislative history of the statute. See Craig
M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV.
837, 877 n.227 (noting that the RICO conspiracy provision was not discussed by the House
or Senate Reports and that no clarification beyond reciting the text was offered). Instead, the
clause seems something of an afterthought, tacked on to ensure that RICO would have its
intended wide-reaching effects in combating racketeering and organized crime.
159See Cotting, supra note 153, at 727 n.7.
160 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
161Id. at 63-64.
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such language appears in the Supreme
affairs of an enterprise" 162-no
Court's Reves decision.
The circuits have split on this question. Initially, the Third and Ninth
Circuits applied the Reves "operation or management" test to RICO
conspiracy. 63 Conversely, the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
rejected the application of Reves.' 64 The landscape changed somewhat,
however, after Supreme Court's decision in Salinas. Although the case did
not deal directly with this question, it offered such a broad interpretation of
RICO conspiracy that many circuits, including the Third, assumed that
Reves could not possibly apply to that provision. As a result, today the
Ninth Circuit is the only jurisdiction that still applies Reves to suits under
§ 1962(d).
In determining whether Reves applies to RICO conspiracy, it is helpful
to ask the question both pre- and post-Salinas. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Salinas, the Third Circuit plainly had the better
65
Postreasoned and more convincing analysis of the extension of Reves.
Salinas, the question becomes the true effect of this decision and whether
the reasoning of Salinas necessarily precludes the application of Reves to
RICO conspiracy. Next, to the extent that Salinas does preclude such an
application, how sound is the reasoning and resultant policy?
The Third Circuit first considered questions surrounding the
interaction of Reves and § 1962(d) in the 1995 case of United States v.
Antar.166 The case involved the criminal RICO prosecution of the owners
and associates of the Crazy Eddie electronics retail chain in New Jersey,
predicated on multiple counts of securities and mail fraud. 167 The circuit
case involved the appeal of one defendant, Mitchell Antar, who challenged
his RICO conspiracy conviction based on predicate acts that occurred after
he had left the RICO enterprise, Crazy Eddie, Inc. 168 The court in Antar
stated that, in light of the Reves "operation or management" requirement,
the defendant could not have been convicted of a substantive § 1962(c)
violation based on predicate acts committed after he left the enterprise, as
162 Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

163See, e.g., Niebel v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
164United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1547 (1lth Cir. 1995); Napoli v. United
States, 45 F.3d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1485 (7th

Cir. 1993).
165See discussion infra Section IV.C (describing how the Third Circuit's rule best
accorded with the text and legislative intent of RICO).
166 53 F.3d 568.
167 See id. at 572.
168 Id. at 580.
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he then no longer played any role in managing or controlling the
organization. 169 While noting that many courts had sustained convictions
under § 1962(d) for which the defendant could not have been guilty of the
substantive violation, the court concluded that Reves must have some effect
on the scope of RICO conspiracy liability.170 Otherwise, the Third Circuit
reasoned, "courts risk eviscerating Reves by blanketly approving conspiracy
convictions when substantive convictions under section 1962(c) are
unavailable."17' 1 Consequently, the court extended Reves to conspiracy
charges, opining that "conspiring to operate or manage an enterprise" would
carry liability, while merely "conspiring with someone who is operating or
managing the enterprise" would not. 172 The court explained the seemingly
fine distinction in that "in the former situation, the defendant is conspiring
to do something for which, if the act was completed successfully, he or she
would be liable under § 1962(c). But in the latter scenario, the defendant is
not ..

,,173

The reasoning of the Third Circuit was adopted with limited additional
74
elaboration by the Ninth Circuit in Niebel v. Trans World Assurance Co. 1
After noting some disagreement among the circuits on this issue, the court
determined that the Third Circuit's rationale best comported with its
reading of Reves and the previous language it had employed to describe the
requirements of liability under RICO conspiracy. 175 As a result, the court
noted that the burden of sustaining a § 1962(d) claim would not be met for a
given defendant merely by showing that he knew about some illegal
scheme, that he benefited from it, or even that he conspired with one of the
principal actors. 176 Instead, the moving party would be required to show
that the 7defendant agreed to have some part in directing the enterprise's
7
affairs.
169

Id.

170 Id.

' Id. at 581.
172

Id.

Id. While the court adopted the defendant's interpretation of § 1962(d), they still
affirmed his liability under that provision because he had not sufficiently demonstrated
withdrawal from the conspiracy. Id. at 583.
174 108 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1997).
171 Id. at 1128.
176 id.
177 Id. Once again, while enunciating the narrower range of liability under RICO
conspiracy, the court nonetheless sustained the conviction of the defendant raising the
argument, Trans World Assurance Company. Id at 1129; see also Congregacion de la
Mision Provincia v. Curi, 978 F. Supp. 435, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Niebel and Antar in
determining that the defendant must have agreed to participate in management of enterprise
for RICO conspiracy liability).
173
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Contrary to the Third and Ninth Circuits, the majority of circuits
rejected any application of Reves to RICO conspiracy charges. Most
influential among these was the Seventh Circuit, which announced its
interpretation in United States v. Quintanilla.178 The case involved RICO
charges against defendants Carlos Quintanilla and Leticia Gutierrez,
stemming from a scheme to defraud the G. Heileman Brewing Company
via the submission of false funding proposals to the company's corporate
sponsorship program. 179 Although defendant Gutierrez initially cooperated
with the government in their efforts to investigate and prosecute "big fish"
involved with the scheme, another defendant named Joseph Monreal
eventually also opted to cooperate, testifying against Quintanilla and
Gutierrez. 18
Both defendants were convicted under § 1962(d), and
Gutierrez appealed her conviction, contending that Reves should apply to
RICO conspiracy charges and that she had not taken part in the operation or
81
management of the criminal enterprise.'
Although the Seventh Circuit's opinion is widely cited as rejecting any
application of Reves to RICO conspiracy, the real focus of the reasoning is
the question of whether the defendant must personally agree to commit two
RICO predicate acts in order to be liable under the conspiracy charge-a
contention the court clearly denies.18 2 While the Seventh Circuit plainly
rejects the idea that a conspiracy charge must be dismissed merely because
a defendant could not be convicted of the substantive offense-a basic
precept of criminal conspiracy-the logic of the opinion, if simplistic, is
somewhat muddled. The bottom line of the analysis is that the Reves
decision, on its own terms, applied only to the substantive RICO charge,
§ 1962(c), and not to § 1962(d).' 8 3 What the court does not explain is
precisely why Reves nonetheless does not in any way impact the
requirements of RICO conspiracy based on an agreement to violate
2 F.3d 1469 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1471.
180 Id. at 1472.
181Id. at 1484.
182 See id. at 1484-85.
178
"9

183 Id. The decision is based largely on Jones v. Meridian Towers Apartments, Inc., a

D.C. District Court opinion interpreting the requirements of RICO conspiracy in light of
Yellow Bus. 816 F. Supp. 762, 772-73 (D.D.C. 1993). The Jones court employed reasoning
substantially similar to that applied by the Seventh Circuit in later decisions-namely that
RICO conspiracy operates against the backdrop of traditional conspiracy laws and that one
need not personally agree to commit an act or even be capable of committing the act in order
to be guilty of conspiracy-in ruling that Yellow Bus did not limit the scope of RICO
conspiracy. Id. at 772. Although Jones is a precursor to the Seventh Circuit's Quintanilla
decision, this discussion focuses on Quintanillabecause it is more frequently cited by other
courts in rejecting the application of Reves to § 1962(d).

SARAH BA UMGAR TEL

[Vol. 97

§ 1962(c). In addition, the court conflisingly offers two different standards
for RICO conspiracy liability. At one point, the court quotes a previous
Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Neapolitan, to state that "a RICO
conspiracy requires only an agreement to conduct or participate in the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity"; 184 this is
essentially the same language as the standard established by the Third
Circuit in Antar. However, later in the opinion, the court in Quintanilla
seemingly modifies its liability standard, stating:
[O]ur cases make clear that § 1962(d) liability is not coterminous with liability under
§ 1962(c)....
We agree with the District of Columbia that "[T]o hold that under § 1962(d) [the
government] must show that an alleged coconspirator was capable of violating the
substantive offense under § 1962(c), that is, that he participated to the extent required
by Reves 'would add an element to RICO conspiracy that Congress did not

direct.'"19

Once again, while the court adamantly rejects the argument that Reves
impacts RICO conspiracy liability, the actual focus of much of the analysis
and language seems to be the separate and difficult question of what level
of personal participation in the predicate acts is necessary for conspiracy
liability. The court speaks more directly to whether a given defendant must
agree to commit crimes personally,' 86 rather than whether her original
conspiratorial agreement must embrace the management or operation of
some enterprise (as opposed to mere association with or participation in an
enterprise).
Nonetheless, this opinion was relied upon by other circuits in rejecting
any application of the Reves standard to RICO conspiracy charges based on
a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). In Napoli v. United States, the Second
Circuit stated 187
simply that a RICO conspiracy conviction is "unaffected
Reves."'
by...
184 Quintanilla, 2 F.3d at 1484 (quoting United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498
(7th Cir. 1986)).
185 Id. at 1485 (quoting Jones, 816 F. Supp. at 773) (citations omitted).
186 See id. at 1484.
187 Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1995). The Napoli opinion cited an

earlier Second Circuit case, United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994), which in turn
relied upon Quintanilla. It is not an entirely appropriate citation for the proposition for
which the court in Napoli offers it, however, and it is worth being precise. Specifically, the
Viola court stated that "[r]eversal of [the defendant's] substantive RICO conviction because
he did not participate in the operation or management of the enterprise does not require
automatic reversal of his conviction under RICO's conspiracy provision .. " Viola, 35
F.3d at 43. The Viola court went on to repeat the Seventh Circuit's formulation of RICO
conspiracy in Neapolitan, describing RICO conspiracy as an agreement to conduct or
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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Starrett stated, "We
agree with the Second and Seventh Circuits that the Supreme Court's Reves

test does not apply to a conviction for RICO conspiracy."' 88 The court
articulated a requirement of only an agreement "to participate" in the
activities of the enterprise in question for the purposes of RICO conspiracy
liability. 189
C. IN DEFENSE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION IN UNITED
STATES V.ANTAR

In many ways, the repeated phrasing of the question at issue
throughout this Article is slightly inaccurate. The question is not merely
whether Reves should apply to § 1962(d), but more precisely, how it should
apply. Even in prosecutions for RICO conspiracy in the Second, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits, the moving party must prove that some individual
operated or managed (or agreed to operate or manage) an enterprise.1 90 The
question is whether some contemplated participation in the operation or

management of an enterprise must be established with respect to every
defendant, exactly what such proof would entail, and precisely what the
initial conspiratorial agreement made by each defendant must embrace.1 9'
In answering this question, the Third Circuit's formulation in Antar is
that which best accords with the text and apparent legislative intent of
RICO. 192 Both Reves and traditional conspiracy doctrine counsel in favor
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through
racketeering activity. Id. The court also noted that conspiracy is shown only where the
defendant "embraced the objective of the alleged conspiracy." Id. Arguably, then, the
court's formulation of RICO conspiracy requirements and its application in this case actually
comports with some limited application of the Reves principles.
188 United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Napoli, 45 F.3d
680; Quintanilla,2 F.3d 1469).
189 Id. Nonetheless, in both Starrett and Napoli, the court stated that the defendants met
the Reves standard under the substantive counts, and evinced clear feelings that the
defendants were bad actors. In Napoli, the court stated it was without difficulty in finding
that petitioners met the Reves test under § 1962(c) and that the "evidence of guilt ...was
overwhelming." 45 F.3d at 684. In Starrett,the court noted that the primary defendant was
the President of the RICO enterprise, the "Outlaw Motorcycle Club," and that the other
defendants all also met the substantive § 1962(c) standard. 55 F.3d at 1547, 1549. The
courts' opinions regarding the culpability of the defendants undoubtedly contributed to their
readiness to ignore potential legal barriers to conviction.
190 See, e.g., United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2002).
191Note that this question is complicated by the fact that § 1962(c) itself does not have a
mens rea requirement, making formulation of the exact conspiracy requirements difficult.
For a discussion of this problem, see Tarlow, supra note 21, at 235.
192 Although it has not yet been discussed in this Article, in a 2000 case, the Seventh
Circuit offered an unusually thorough and thoughtful consideration of this specific question,
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of the extension of conspiracy liability only to those who agree to operate or
manage a RICO enterprise. Because this is a conspiracy charge, the
agreement need not ever come to fruition; the defendant need not actually
conduct the enterprise. But, pursuant to the fundamental precepts of Reves
and traditional criminal conspiracy requirements, the defendant at least
must be in a position to enter into a meaningful agreement that the conduct
of an enterprise will be accomplished, meaning that she must have some
capacity to effectuate this management and some personal control over the
direction of the enterprise. 193 By accepting this, Antar's standard is superior
to the standards of courts that have rejected any application of Reves to
RICO conspiracy and to those courts' standards that have offered less
rigorous forms of the rule, including post-Salinas decisions by the Seventh
Circuit. The rule is seemingly compelled by a careful reading of RICO's
provisions and represents the most effective means of protecting the Reves
test from abrogation through lenient application of conspiracy liability to
194
those who might otherwise be excluded from RICO's reach.
Additionally, Antar's construction separates those liable under Reves from
those who are not in a way that comports with the statutory aims of RICO,
preserving the special functions of the RICO conspiracy clause.

ultimately determining that one can be guilty under § 1962(d) if he knowingly facilitates the
operators or managers to whom § 1962(c) liability applies. See Brouwer v. Raffensperger,
Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). This ultimate conclusion as to the
standard of liability is problematic because its lax personal participation requirement does
not limit liability to those who actually have some capacity to operate or control an
enterprise as intended by Reves, and because the formulation runs afoul of traditional
conspiracy liability principles. In addition, the Seventh Circuit itself seemingly adopted a
somewhat broader standard for RICO conspiracy liability (perhaps unintentionally), reading
out the knowledge requirement of Brouwer. See Warneke, 310 F.3d at 547. Nonetheless,
much of the decision's reasoning will be referenced as it is helpful in attempting to
determine the mens rea requirement for RICO conspiracy liability.
193 Note that this is not an unduly rigorous restriction, as the Supreme Court explained in
Reves that many defendants potentially meet its standard though they might not be within an
enterprise's core managerial group or traditional insiders. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507
U.S. 170, 184-85 (1993); see also Clarkin, supra note 56, at 1065-66 (analyzing post-Reves
decisions, claiming that many cases that purported to apply a more lenient standard of
liability under § 1962(c) nonetheless involved defendants who would likely fit the Reves
test).
194 For further support for this proposition, see Stephanie Profitt, RICO Conspiracy:
The
Ninth Circuit DistinguishesItselffrom the Rising Cost of Guilty Thoughts, 33 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 47, 67 (summarizing the interpretation of most courts of the interaction of Reves
and RICO conspiracy and concluding that most courts had reached "an overly-broad
interpretation of the RICO conspiracy provision that does not support the intent of the statute
or the policy it reflects").
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i. From the Perspectiveof the Reves Test
First, clearly some proof of operation or management of an enterprise
must be established in a RICO conspiracy prosecution based on § 1962(c).
"Operation or management" is an element of the substantive offense. Just
as the prosecution in a given case must prove the existence of a RICO
enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity, with the commission of at
least two predicate acts, they must offer proof that some individual
"conducted" an enterprise. 195 The only real question is how this should
apply to each individual defendant.
The oversight that most courts make in interpreting the interaction of
§ 1962(d) and Reves is that they focus entirely on conspiracy law,
completely ignoring the rationale and intent of Reves. Obviously, however,
when one considers the law of conspiracy based on an agreement to commit
murder, for example, one must analyze both conspiracy and murder
doctrines.
Orienting the inquiry in this fashion, Reves itself counsels that the
standard must apply to limit conspiracy liability to those who conspire to
operate or manage an enterprise, and not merely those who conspire with
someone who operates or manages an enterprise. 196 Reves explicitly ruled
that Congress, in enacting RICO, intended to extend liability only to those
involved in the operation of enterprises through a pattern of racketeering
activity and not to those who merely committed predicate acts or merely
associated with an enterprise. 197 This is entirely consistent with the
legislative history as detailed above, and this, in a nutshell, is the rationale
of Antar's limited construction of the RICO conspiracy provision.
Interestingly, the Antar opinion is heavily criticized by frequent RICO
commentator and expert, G. Robert Blakey, who, in an article on Reves
with Kevin P. Roddy, denounces the Third Circuit's reasoning as "topsyturvy"-an improper attempt to determine the meaning of RICO through
negative inference. 198 Opaquely, he states:
Reves is silent about conspiracy liability under RICO; it speaks to liability of a
principal in the first degree. Silence, in this context, is "no thing," that is,
zero .... Zero equals zero no matter how many times you multiply it by any
figure .... Antar... therefore, cannot be squared with basic techniques of statutory
interpretation, much199less with the purpose of RICO, which sought to broaden, not
narrow the law ....

195 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179.
196

See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 581 (3d Cir. 1995).

197 See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183-84.

198Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1514.
199 Id.
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Indeed, the "zero equals zero" rationale seems compelling to many courts,
which repeatedly address this question by simply stating that Reves was an
interpretation of § 1962(c) and therefore cannot possibly have any relevance
to § 1962(d).2 °°
Antar is not a negative inference or attempt to reason from legislative
silence, but rather an attempt to enforce an affirmative limit on the outer
bounds of liability clearly intended by the text and legislative history of
RICO (as explicated by the Supreme Court in Reves). 20 1 Again, Reves is
not a prudential rule, but rather a definitive statement on whom Congress
chose to include and exclude from liability under the RICO statute. And in
order to effectuate the intended limit on liability discussed in Reves, the
"operation or management" requirement must also apply to prosecutions
under RICO conspiracy. To do otherwise would merely shift prosecution
of a certain class of individuals no longer liable under § 1962(c) to
§ 1962(d), thus entirely undermining the intended statutory exclusion of
these individuals from RICO liability.
Put another way, given that RICO substantive and conspiracy charges
carry exactly the same penalty, 202 what could possibly be the legislative
design in exempting a certain class of tangentially associated individuals
from liability under § 1962(c) only to allow their prosecution under
§ 1962(d)? Precision in charging? It is easy to see what the RICO
conspiracy provision still accomplishes if Reves is extended to apply to
conspiracy charges; 20 3 it is impossible to see what Reves accomplishes if it
is not extended to conspiracy.
Indeed, it is not surprising that the courts that initially rejected Reves's
narrow construction of liability under § 1962(c) are similarly hostile to
extending the standard to § 1962(d).20 4
Several commentators have
200

See discussion supra Section IV.B.

211 See Antar, 53 F.3d at 581; see also Profitt, supra note 194, at 55 (clarifying
that

"[Antar] is based on the reasoning that it would not make sense to exclude a class of people
from a participation violation, only to make those same people liable for conspiring to
violate that section").
202 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (d) (2000).
203 See discussion infra Section IV.B.i.
204 These include the Second and Eleventh Circuits, which both initially
offered a broad
construction of § 1962(c). See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross &
Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.
1980). This observation probably also applies to at least a few legal commentators who
argue against an extension of Reves to § 1962(d). For instance, Blakey and Roddy, who
vigorously criticize the Third Circuit's opinion and all but a limited extension of Reves, see
Blakey & Roddy, supra note 131, at 1514, also strenuously argue for the use of RICO to
combat "professional malfeasance and fraudulent misbehavior" on the part of what many
would consider traditional Reves outsiders. See id. at 1361.
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recognized that one reason that Reves has had less effect than anticipated,
particularly in insulating so-called "outsiders" from liability, is that
prosecutions have merely shifted to RICO conspiracy charges. °5 The two
classes of individuals that Reves potentially exempts from liabilityoutsiders who have little control over the enterprise and insiders so far
down the chain of command that they have no ability to operate or
control-are therefore simply pulled back in under a broad reading of
§ 1962(d), rendering them subject to the same RICO penalties as other
defendants. Importantly, these are likely to be the least culpable individuals
when judged in comparison to others involved in the overall scheme; they
are those that Congress most likely intended to exclude from RICO's broad
reach; and they are the individuals most likely to be significantly impacted
and harmed through the associational guilt that many see as a huge risk of
RICO.20 6 The basic point is that, by its own terms, Reves must be extended
to charges of RICO conspiracy to have any success at all in effectuating
Congress's intended limit on liability; courts that oppose this extension are
challenging the Reves decision itself.
The intent and practical application of Reves also supports the
propriety of the seemingly fine distinction that Antar draws between those
who conspire to operate an enterprise and those that conspire with someone
who operates an enterprise, limiting liability to the former.20 7 The Seventh
Circuit dismisses this distinction in United States v. Warneke, a postSalinas decision ruling that a defendant can be guilty of conspiracy to
violate § 1962(c) any time he "join[s] forces with someone else who
manages or operates the enterprise. 20 8 The problem with this formulation,
however, is that it directly contravenes Reves in two ways: first, by
arguably criminalizing simply aiding or abetting a RICO enterprise; and
second, by extending liability to many outsiders exempted by Reves.
Although it is not clear what precisely "joining forces" with a RICO
manager would involve or what knowledge as to the extent of the
205 See, e.g., Disanto, supra note 144, at 1063 ("Unfortunately, in the aftermath of Reves,

it has become clear that the 'operation or management' test is easily circumventable
by ... conspiracy and aiding and abetting, and therefore is not a limitation on the scope of
RICO at all."); see also Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 20, Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (No. 96-738)
(recognizing tension between overly inclusive conspiracy liability under the Salinas and
Reves rules); W.B. Markovits, Expanding RICO Civil Liability for Lawyers and Other
"Outsiders": Perspectives of a Plaintiff's Lawyer, FED. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 35 (guiding
practitioners in how to avoid Reves restrictions on liability through the use of conspiracy and

abettor liability).
206 See infra Section IV.D.ii for a more in-depth discussion of these issues.
207 See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 581 (3d Cir. 1995).
208 United States v. Wameke, 310 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2003).
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conspiracy would have to be proven on the part of the defendant, the first
point is that this potentially extends liability to someone who merely
renders assistance, encouragement, or support to the enterprise by helping
one of its directors. The possibility of such aiding and abetting liability was
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Reves.20 9
More fundamentally, this construction allows RICO liability for many
"outsiders" or non-managers exempted by Reves. Two major cases, United
States v. ElliottP o and United States v. Viola,211 are useful in illustrating this
problem. Both are instances where individuals tangentially associated with
an enterprise conspire or act with a manager of that enterprise, meaning that
they fall within the Seventh Circuit's formulation of liability. For example,
in Viola, the epitomic outsider, Michael Formisano (whose involvement
with the broader criminal RICO conspiracy basically amounted to a few
minor crimes and odd jobs) worked directly with the primary RICO
defendant, Anthony Viola.21 2 Similarly in Elliott, the various defendants
associated with different criminal endeavors were all connected via their
association with the principal defendant, J.C. Hawkins.21 3 The point is that
a purported application of Reves "limiting" conspiracy liability to those
who conspire with one who conducts an enterprise may frequently turn out
to be no limitation at all. Consequently, such a construction will not
effectuate the congressional intent of excluding certain persons from
liability.
Antar's argument for a more rigorous application of Reves to
§ 1962(d) is additionally bolstered by the fact that RICO conspiracy is still
entirely effective at satisfying its ostensible aims if the Reves standard is
applied. First, it still effectuates a primary aim of conspiracy generally,
allowing law enforcement intervention at an earlier stage of criminality,
potentially before any illegal acts (other than the conspiratorial agreement)
have been committed.2 14

See Reves v. United States, 507 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1993); see also Blakey & Roddy,
supra note 131, at 1367; Markovits, supra note 205, at 37 (recognizing Reves's limitation on
209

aiding and abetting liability under § 1962(c)).
210 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
211 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994).
212 Id. at 39-40.
213 Elliot, 571 F.2d at 895-96.
214 Cf JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING

CRIMINAL LAW

§ 29.02 (3d ed. 2001)

(describing the primary aims of conspiracy liability). Obviously the other main objective of
conspiracy statutes-increasing penalties to account for the special dangers of group
criminality, see United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); DRESSLER, supra, §
29.02-is already accounted for by the substantive RICO offense itself.

2006]

THE CRIME OF ASSOCIA TING WITH CRIMINALS?

33

Second, application of the Reves test does not interfere with the
conspiracy provision's primary punitive aim-reaching insulated organized
crime leaders or other "big fish" previously unreachable by traditional law
enforcement tools because they did not participate directly in the
commission of crimes. The legislative history is replete with congressional
concern about these individuals and the clear aim that RICO be drafted to
reach them.21 5
In addition, several courts and commentators have
recognized this as the primary purpose of the RICO conspiracy provision.2 6
As the Seventh Circuit noted, Congress seemingly "intended section
1962(d) to be broad enough to encompass those persons who, while
intimately involved in the conspiracy, neither agreed to personally commit
nor actually participated in the commission of the predicate crimes," so
called "insulated ring leaders. 21 7 Extending Reves to § 1962(d) does not
disturb this important purpose. Rather, it allows RICO to sweep broadly
enough to trap these "big fish" in its remedial net, while preserving the
congressionally intended limit on the liability of outsiders.
In other words, contrary to what many circuits suggest, importing the
Reves restriction on liability does not violate the fundamental precept of
conspiracy that one need not be guilty of the substantive crime to be liable
as a conspirator. There will be a large class of individuals who could not be
convicted of the substantive crime, but who are nevertheless swept in by
RICO conspiracy as a result of their planning efforts. Even with the Reves
limitation, RICO conspiracy does a good degree of work. With Reves, it
likely does the specific work that Congress intended-allowing RICO to
reach leaders of organized crime groups or other enterprises, especially
those that infiltrate legitimate businesses, while leaving less severe
traditional law enforcement remedies to deal with subordinate, less culpable
associates.
ii. From the Perspectiveof Hornbook Criminal Conspiracy Law
While the terms of Reves itself counsel in favor of application to RICO
conspiracy, many courts contend that such an application is simply
inconsistent with conspiracy law; that it would require more proof with a

215 See Lynch, supra note

9 (discussing the legislative history of RICO); see also Blakey,

supra note 9.

216 See, e.g., United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986); Goldsmith,

supra note 9, at 798-99 (emphasizing the importance of RICO conspiracy in reaching the
leadership of mob families, who frequently cannot be convicted of the substantive offense);
Minnis, supra note 151, at 1412 (describing the primary purpose of RICO conspiracy as
assisting in prosecution of leaders of criminal enterprises).
217See Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 498.
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RICO prosecution than under any other form of conspiracy." 8 Contrary to
these assertions, however, extension best accords with hornbook conspiracy
doctrine.
The first and most basic reason is that the application of Reves to
conspiracy charges does not demand any more proof than other applications
of conspiracy liability. It is well established that the crime of conspiracy is
defined in terms of the precise nature and scope of the conspiratorial
agreement. 21 9 Thus, to actually conspire to violate § 1962(c), a party must
enter into an agreement that embraces every element of the RICO offense,
including management or control of a RICO enterprise.
Furthermore, precise conspiracy standards emphasize that conspiracy
is not merely a combination of people or a "partnership" for criminal
purposes, but rather a specific "union of wills" defined according to an
agreement. 220 To borrow an example from Dressier, if X and Y conspire
together and D intentionally aids them in the commission of some crime, D
is not automatically a party to the conspiracy. 221 In order to be part of the
conspiracy, D must aid the initial formation of the agreement, not merely
offer corollary or subsequent assistance.2 22 As a result, a defendant does
not become engaged in the full criminal conspiracy merely by working with
or offering assistance to one of the conspirators.
The significance is that this reveals a problem with the Seventh
Circuit's limited application of Reves. In United States v. Warneke, the
court finds a violation of § 1962(d) whenever a conspirator "join[s] forces"
with an operator or manager of a RICO enterprise. 223 This finding would
only be accurate, however, if the defendant's agreement with that person
specifically includes the operation or management component of § 1962(c).
To give a more concrete formulation of the issue, a defendant would not be
guilty under § 1962(d) of conspiring to violate RICO if she merely
conspired to commit murder with a drug kingpin. Although the kingpin
could likely be guilty of operating or managing an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of RICO (or at least conspiring
to do so), the defendant's mere association with the kingpin or agreement
with him to commit one crime should not be sufficient to carry RICO
218 See, e.g., United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 99 (2d Cir. 2000).
219 See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).
220 See DRESSLER, supra note 214, at § 29.04[B].
221 Id.
222

Id.; see also Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1942) (ruling one is

not a conspirator if he merely aids, abets, furthers, promotes, or cooperates in the
conspiracy).
223 United States v. Wameke, 310 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2002).
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liability without further proof relating to a broader agreement or knowledge
on the part of the defendant. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's phrasing
does not account for this problem.
Under basic conspiracy principles, then, the prosecution or moving
party should have to show something like the Third Circuit's formulationthat the defendant initially agreed to the operation or management of an
enterprise through such a racketeering pattern (regardless of whatever other
acts he also agreed to commit personally). This essentially means that the
defendant at least aided the formation of the initial conspiratorial
agreement, and not that he merely assisted in its implementation after the
fact.
Finally, a more clear-cut rationale for rejecting any attempt to restrict
the reach of Reves based on hornbook conspiracy law involves the Gebardi
rule. In Gebardi v. United States, a man and a woman were charged with
conspiracy to violate the Mann Act 224 as a result of their agreement to travel
across state lines so that the woman could engage in sexual relations with
the man. 225 The question facing the Court was whether a woman who was
transported could be convicted of general conspiracy, given that the
legislature had intentionally drafted the Act to protect the involved woman
226
and had explicitly excluded her from substantive liability under the Act.
While the Supreme Court recognized that an inability to commit the
substantive offense did not necessarily render one immune from conspiracy
liability, the Court rejected conspiracy liability for the woman based on
what the Court characterized as the affirmative intent of the legislature not
to punish the involved woman under the Mann Act. 227
Dressler relates the simple rule of the case as follows: "A person may
not be convicted of conspiracy to violate an offense if her conviction would
frustrate a legislative purpose to exempt her from prosecution for the
substantive crime. 22 8 Lower courts have applied this rule to limit the reach
of conspiracy or aiding and abetting liability in other contexts, such as those
involving the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute. 9
The relevant text of the Mann Act criminalizes "knowing[] transport... ininterstate
commerce ...[of] any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose." 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000).
225 See United States v. Gebardi, 287 U.S. 112, 116 (1932).
226 See id. at 120-21.
227 See id. at 123.
228 DRESSLER, supra note 214, at § 29.09[D][1].
229 See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1991) (declining to
extend general federal conspiracy liability to parties exempted from substantive offense
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381 (2d Cir.
1987) (applying Gebardi to limit aiding and abetting liability stemming from the Continuing
224
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In the present, context, the Gebardi rule militates against conspiracy
liability for those excluded from the substantive RICO offense by means of
the Reves standard. In Reves, the Supreme Court recognized an affirmative
legislative intent to limit the scope of substantive liability under RICO,
stating, "[i]n this case it is clear that Congress did not intend to extend
RICO liability under § 1962(c) beyond those who participate in the
operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity., 30 This echoes important comments in the legislative history,
such as those by Senator McClellan that RICO liability would not extend to
all individuals who committed racketeering offenses, but only to those who
"engage[d] in a pattern of such violations, and use[d] that pattern to obtain
or operate an interest in an interstate business., 231 It is in direct
contravention of this congressional intent to allow the Reves exclusion to be
undermined by a wide-reaching application of RICO conspiracy liability.
As a result, not only do the language and policy that undergird Reves
counsel in favor of its extension to RICO conspiracy, common law criminal
conspiracy principles also compel such an extension to avoid undermining
an affirmative legislative intent to limit the reach of RICO liability.
In examining the interaction of Reves and RICO conspiracy, it is not
that courts outside the Third Circuit have dismissed these arguments, but
rather that they have failed to fully consider them. The Second and
Eleventh Circuits, for example, have preferred to repeat conspiracy truisms
rather than engage in a searching analysis of what the language of the
standard actually means, the intent of the Supreme Court and Congress in
establishing the standard, the effect of specific conspiracy principles in this

Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000), based on the affirmative legislative intent
in the statute to target primarily ring leaders, thereby limiting liability of others involved
with continuing criminal enterprises: "Here Congress defined the offense as leadership of the
enterprise, necessarily excluding those who do not lead"); cf United States v. Michael, 456
F. Supp. 335, 349 (D.N.J. 1978) (reading the possibility of conspiracy liability to hinge on
the question of affirmative legislative intent). Some courts read the rule as exempting only
legislatively "protected" classes, 6 r those who are clearly victims of the crime in question.
See, e.g., United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1983). So narrow a reading is by no means compelled
by the language of the decision, however. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted in response
to this argument:
We are not persuaded. .. that there is any logical reason for giving the legislative exemption the
very limited construction.... In our opinion, and as the cases suggest, the resolution hinges on
whether it would frustrate the legislature's intent to exempt a certain class of persons if those
persons could then be punished under a conspiracy statute.
Lythgoe v. State, 626 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Alaska 1980).
230 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993).
231 Id. at 183 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. S586, 18940 (statement of Sen. McClellan)).
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context, and the strong policy reasons supporting the Third Circuit's initial
extension of Reves. The result is a series of incestuous opinions that
mechanically build on and cite one another while adding little value to a
thoughtful discussion of the question.232 This hostility towards extension
seems intertwined with a basic hostility that persists towards the application
of Reves to substantive charges, and a concomitant reluctance to allow the
rigorous application of Reves in conspiracy cases where courts see real
culpability on the part of defendants.
D. THE INTERACTION OF REVES AND § 1962(D) AFTER SALINAS:
ACCOMMODATING THE COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF
RICO CONSPIRACY
If the situation appeared dire for RICO conspiracy defendants hoping
to extend Reves's limitation on liability to the charges against them before
1997, it deteriorated further that year with the Supreme Court's decision in
Salinas v. United States.233 The decision clarified certain aspects of RICO
conspiracy, with obvious implications for the application of Reves.
i. The Supreme Court's Decision in Salinas v. United States
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salinas to settle a question of
RICO conspiracy jurisprudence that had long divided lower courts, namely,
whether a conspirator must personally agree to commit or actually commit
two predicate racketeering acts in order to be liable under § 1962(d).234 The
specific facts of the case involved the prosecution of a local sheriff and his
deputy in connection with ongoing bribery schemes involving federal
prisoners in their custody.235
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kennedy outlined the
requirements of RICO conspiracy liability, stating, "A conspirator must
intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the
elements of a substantive criminal offense. 2 36 This was accomplished
provided the conspirator adopted the goal of furthering or facilitating the
criminal endeavor, and did not require that the conspirator personally agree
to commit any particular act in furtherance of the conspiracy.23 7 The Court
assumed that the simple language of § 1962(d) conveyed congressional

232

See discussion supra Section IV.B.

233 522 U.S. 52 (1997).

See id. at 61-62.
Id. at 54-55.
216 Id. at 65.
234
235

237 Id.
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intent to incorporate background criminal conspiracy principles. 238 With
this in mind, the Court stated that it was clear that conspirators need not be
required "to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive
offense" and that one may be liable for conspiracy even if incapable of
committing the substantive crime.23 9 Conspirators were required only to
share a common purpose.240
Although not directly on point, it is easy to see how this expansive
formulation of RICO conspiracy liability affected consideration of the
Reves question, as was specifically observed by several courts. For
example, in its initial consideration of the question in 1998, the Fifth Circuit
relied heavily on Salinas to determine that Reves did not apply in any way
to RICO conspiracy charges.241 Instead, the court ruled, RICO conspiracy
is established where the government shows that two or more people agreed
to commit a substantive RICO offense and the defendant knew of and
agreed to the overall objective of that offense. 42
Similarly, the Second Circuit relied on Salinas in reaffirming its prior
interpretation of the interaction of Reves and § 1962(d), citing Salinas
directly for the proposition that the "operation or management" test did not
apply to RICO conspiracy charges.2 43 The court set the standard for RICO
conspiracy liability as follows: "Assuming that a RICO enterprise exists,
the government must prove only 'that the defendant[s] ... know the general
nature of the conspiracy
and that the conspiracy extends beyond [their]
244
individual role[s].'
The Seventh Circuit has offered the most in-depth analysis of RICO
conspiracy post-Salinas. In a series of cases including Goren v. New Vision
International, Inc.,245 Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co.,246 and
238 See id. at 63.
239 Id. at 63-64.

240

Id.

241See United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998). Once again, one

might be a bit suspicious of the fidelity of the Fifth Circuit to Reves itself in answering this
question-the court actually employed its pre-Reves standard for determining liability under
§ 1962(c), enunciated in United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), though this
standard is arguably much more expansive than the law established by the Supreme Court.
See Posadas-Rios, 158 F.3d at 856.
242 Posadas-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857.
243 See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 99 (2d
Cir. 2000).
244Id. (quoting United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also
Castro v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (referencing Salinas in
support of established Eleventh Circuit law that Reves modifies only the substantive
§ 1962(c) charge and that a defendant need not agree to the operation or management of an
enterprise to incur RICO conspiracy liability).
245 156 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1998).
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United States v. Warneke,24 v the Seventh Circuit has outlined its
formulation of RICO conspiracy requirements. These cases have afforded
questions involving the reach of RICO conspiracy liability and, specifically,
the interaction of Reves and § 1962(d), a much more thorough and
searching analysis than any other circuit. 248 Ultimately, however, with
some reliance on the Salinas decision, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the requirements of proving a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) will be met
"whenever the conspirator joins forces with someone else who manages or
operates the enterprise., 249 The court, therefore, specifically rejected
United States v. Antar' S250 application of Reves to the conspiracy provision.
Finally, and most notably, the Third Circuit concluded that Salinas
implicitly overruled its decision in Antar to apply Reves to RICO
conspiracy.251 In rejecting its previous application of the Reves test and a
requirement that the defendant agree to participate in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs to sustain liability, the Third Circuit stated, "The plain
implication of the standard set forth in Salinas is that one who opts into or
participates in a conspiracy is liable ...even if the defendant did not
personally agree to do, or to conspire with respect to, any particular
element., 252 The court also noted that the vast majority of circuits to
consider the question had come out against its reasoning in Antar.253 The
Third Circuit modified its standard for conspiracy liability to criminalize
any knowing agreement to facilitate a scheme that includes the operation or
254
As a result, today the Ninth Circuit is
management of a RICO enterprise.
the only court that continues rigorously to apply the Reves test to RICO
conspiracy charges.

246

199 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2000).

247 310 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2002).

See, e.g., Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 964.
Warneke, 310 F.3d at 547. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit purported to announce
this standard because "[s]ection 1962(d) is not limited to a conspiracy among the top dogs."
Id. However, Reves itself is not limited to the "top dogs," as the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized that control of an enterprise could extend beyond upper management to many
"lower rung" participants. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 184 (1993).
Consequently, even if Reves were applied in the most rigorous fashion possible to § 1962(d),
conspiracy charges would still never be limited to "top dogs," as the lower court seems to
fear.
248
249

250 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995).
251

See Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 2001).

252

Id.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 538.

253
254
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ii. Reconciling Antar and Salinas
In determining the interaction of Reves and RICO conspiracy going
forward, one important question is whether Salinas actually implicitly
overruled Antar. Although Salinas offered an expansive interpretation of
RICO conspiracy, there is an argument that its language is not inconsistent
with Antar's application of Reves. The essence of the RICO conspiracy
requirement remains the same. However, to the extent that Salinas can be
read as inconsistent with an application of Reves to RICO conspiracy,
Salinas is problematic and should be carefully considered by lower courts
before its broad language is blindly extended and applied.
While Salinas offers an expansive interpretation of the reach of RICO
conspiracy, it leaves certain fundamental precepts intact. First, while the
Court notes that "a conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not
agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive
offense, 255 this is not the same as saying the conspirator need not
specifically agree to any part. The conspirator must still "agree to pursue
the same criminal objective and. . . divide up the work,' 256 and intend "to
further an endeavor, which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements
of a substantive offense. 25 7 In order to agree to such an endeavor,
according to Reves, an agreement to violate § 1962(c) must in some way
embrace the management or control of an enterprise. If the defendant does
not plan to control the enterprise himself, he must at least be party to the
agreement where management is allocated. Therefore liability must still be
limited to those in a position to operate or manage an enterprise, or the
defendant would have no capacity to make this agreement. In addition,
Salinas does not directly criticize or contradict Reves, meaning the earlier
decision still counsels powerfully in favor of an extension of the "operation
or management" test (regardless of what else may or may not be required to
prove RICO conspiracy), in order to effectuate the congressionally
mandated limit on liability.
iii.An Argumentfor Limiting Salinas
To the extent that Salinas does disallow an extension of Reves to
RICO conspiracy, as all courts to consider the issue have ruled, that
decision is problematic. First, Salinas mistakenly assumes a broad-stroke
application of traditional criminal conspiracy principles that might not be
appropriate in the RICO context. The decision is probably correct in its
255

Salinas v.United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997).

256

id.

257

Id. at 65.
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narrow holding that individuals do not personally need to agree to the
commission of two predicates to be liable under RICO conspiracy.258 This
comports with the broad phrasing of the statute and the references in the
legislative history to address insulated organized crime and racketeering
ring leaders. 259 However, the decision should have been more precise.
Even if a defendant need not personally agree to commit two predicate acts,
must he specifically agree or know that someone will commit two predicate
acts? Clarification of this question would help somewhat in sorting out the
Reves issue.
More broadly, the Court would have been better to base its decision on
the text and legislative history of the statute, rather than unnecessarily
repeating what it considers truisms of criminal conspiracy.2 60 The problem
with such an approach is that courts in other contexts have repeatedly
recognized that RICO conspiracy is not like other conspiracies, and that the
old rules of criminal conspiracy do not necessarily apply. 261 In United
States v. Elliott, for example, the Fifth Circuit ruled that traditional
structural requirements of criminal conspiracy under the general federal
conspiracy statute did not apply to RICO prosecutions.26 2 Specifically, the
government was not required to show that a single traditional conspiracy
existed or that there was a "wheel" or "chain" structure.263 In addition, the
government was allowed to prosecute incredibly diverse criminal
endeavors, all in a single proceeding. 264 Thus, RICO established the
phenomenon of the "enterprise conspiracy. ' 265 This is a new kind of
conspiracy that differs from criminal conspiracy in certain significant ways
already recognized by courts. As a result, the Salinas opinion's assertion
that background criminal conspiracy law is simply adopted wholesale is
overly simplistic and unsatisfying.

258 See id. at 64-66. However, the holding is not without its critics. See, e.g., Jeremy M.
Miller, RICO and Conspiracy Construction: The Mischief of the Economic Model, 104 CoM.
L.J. 26, 44 (1999) (commenting that "[t]he old adage that if one says it long enough and

often enough, it must be true, is unfortunately the essential reasoning of Salinas").
259 See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th.Cir. 1986).
260 See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63-64.
261See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Blakely
& Roddy, supra note 131, at 1446 n.389 (collecting cases describing RICO as broadening
traditional conspiracy liability); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 386
(1983) (relating how early RICO decisions described the statute as creating a new kind of
conspiracy law).
262 Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
263 id.
264 Id.

265 See id. at 903.
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What the Salinas Court should have considered specifically in
explicating RICO conspiracy is that, to the extent that RICO builds upon
and modifies traditional conspiracy, it magnifies many of its problems.2 66
While the procedural advantages inherent in this new form of conspiracy
were largely intended by Congress, one unintended consequence was the
increased danger to defendants stemming from the risk of guilt by
association. Commentators frequently criticize the crime of conspiracy and
the attendant criminal procedures for risking this associational guilt. In
fact, the Supreme Court itself explicitly cautioned against charging too
many defendants or too many diverse crimes in a single proceeding for this
reason: "[A]s [the conspiracy] is broadened to include more and more, in
varying degrees of attachment to the confederation, the possibilities for
miscarriage of justice to particular individuals become greater and
greater. ' 2 67 These concerns about traditional criminal conspiracy cases
apply a fortiori to RICO when one considers the breadth of defendants and
crimes possibly linked in a single RICO prosecution, encouraged by the fact
that old structural limitations no longer apply. 268 Elliott specifically
recognized that the purpose of many of the old structural constraints on
269
conspiracy was to protect defendants from so-called "spill-over" effects.
With these constraints removed, RICO cases can span an incredible range
of crimes (with predicate acts ranging from conspiracy to commit securities
fraud to murder 270 ) and include a diverse group of defendants with varying
degrees of involvement with the enterprise-the sheer breadth of these
proceedings must threaten prejudice from spill-over effects to at least some
defendants.2 71 The prospect of unfairness to a defendant and the possibility
266 See Lynch, supra note 21, at 945-47 (discussing the relationship between RICO and
conspiracy broadly and their overlapping substantive and procedural-related fairness

concerns).
267 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
268 Cf Ellen Jancko-Baken, When Will the Idling Statute of Limitations Start Running in

RICO Conspiracy Cases?, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2167, 2182 (1989)

(deeming RICO

conspiracy even more amorphous than traditional criminal conspiracy); Paul Marcus,
Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More
Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 17-18 (1992) (emphasizing concerns related
to guilt by association involving conspiracy charges, accentuated when defendants are joined
in large, complex trials and commenting how these concerns have only been magnified by
RICO).
269 See Elliott, 571 F.2d at 900; see also Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 773.
270 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).
271 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 21, at 929. Lynch discusses United States v. Castellano
as a good example of this problem. That case included twenty-four defendants and seventyeight different counts. See United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1378 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Lynch notes, "While the range of activities charged against the enterprise was vast,
the involvement of many of the defendants in those activities could only be described as

2006]

THE CRIME OF ASSOCIATING WITH CRIMINALS?

43

that she might be convicted merely on the basis of association with her codefendants is real cause for concern.2 72 As Gerard Lynch explicitly noted in
his seminal article on RICO, the compound prejudicial effect of RICO's
new enterprise crime and the statute's procedural allowances is to increase
of criminal conviction for all RICO defendants, guilty or
the 2likelihood
73
not.

As a result, in defining the contours of RICO conspiracy, courts should
look to account for these dangers by making specific and concrete
provisions regarding what must be proven with respect to each individual
defendant.27 4 Indeed, courts should recognize that background conspiracy
requirements have changed and if personal agreement to commit predicate
acts was not intended under the statute, they should seek individualized
proof of elements that were; any implication of Salinas that no particular
element must be proven as to each defendant,2 75 or that nothing has
changed, risks fundamental unfairness to individuals.
In this context, Reves is an appropriate and useful standard of
individualized action, and courts should require that each defendant be
shown to have agreed to the operation or management of the RICO
enterprise. This level of proof is certainly in line with the legislative history
and purposes of the statute. In addition, it has the added benefit of likely
affording the greatest assistance to less culpable defendants who are, in
turn, more likely to suffer the prejudices of guilt by association.

tangential."

Lynch, supra note 21, at 929.

Lynch goes on to assert that this is not an

aberration, but rather a natural and permitted consequence of the RICO statute and offense.
Id. at 930. He further opines that these large prosecutions result because RICO ended some
previously implicit, but nonetheless enforced, limitation on the scope of conspiracy
prosecutions. See id. at 951.
272 Lynch, supra note 21, at 951; see also Yvette M. Mastin, RICO Conspiracy:
Dismantles the Mexican Mafia & Disables ProceduralDue Process, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 2295, 2333 (2001) (describing increased dangers of "spill-over" effects in RICO
conspiracy trials and offering constitutional argument for limitations); Minnis, supra note

151, at 1415 (supporting the interpretation of RICO that defendants need not personally
agree to commit predicate acts in order to be liable for RICO conspiracy, but expressing
misgivings regarding the dangers of guilt by association when a large number of defendants
are tried together); Tarlow, supra note 21, at 251 (noting the guilt by association problems
with RICO).
273See Lynch, supra note 21, at 961. Lynch expressed specific concern, for this and
other reasons, with charges of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). Id. at 981-82.
274 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 773 (noting that conspiracy trials are "exceptional to our
tradition and call for the use of every safeguard to individualize each defendant in relation to
the mass").
275 See Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 37 (3d Cir. 2001) (interpreting Salinas to hold as
such).
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The benefits of this application are clear for two primary reasons.
First, application of Reves to RICO conspiracy liability matters most for
those with only a tangential relationship to the enterprise; if the defendant is
heavily involved with all the enterprise's affairs, he will likely meet the
Reves test regardless, and application to conspiracy would be a moot point.
Second, application of the test will likely affect only those persons who
cannot be found guilty of the substantive crime. If they can be found guilty
of the substantive crime, then in virtually every case they will also be guilty
of conspiracy regardless of Reves. In other words, if the moving party can
prove that the defendant actually managed or operated an enterprise through
the commission of racketeering acts, all proof of conspiracy will likely be
met (or at least the conspiracy charge will be superfluous). It is only where
the substantive charge fails for one reason or another that application of
Reves to RICO conspiracy becomes significant. The further point is that
this class of defendants is likely to have personally committed few, if any,
predicate crimes; otherwise, substantive liability would be easier to
establish.
To summarize, an application of Reves to RICO conspiracy matters
most to defendants tangentially involved with the enterprise, who are facing
exclusively conspiracy charges, and who have committed few, if any,
predicate acts. Given the risks of associational guilt inherent in conspiracy
and, in particular, RICO conspiracy, it is startling that Salinas acts to limit
what must be proven as to this class of defendants. Furthermore,
conspiracy charges are likely to be bolstered by evidence of dealings and
interactions with other defendants, because direct evidence of a conspiracy
is rare and the use of circumstantial inference is widely accepted.2 76 Thus,
defendants described above are those who face the greatest risk of incurring
steep criminal and civil penalties under RICO merely by virtue of their
association with the other defendants. The broad point is that lower courts
might want to give careful consideration to the implications before
mechanically extending Salinas's bold pronouncements regarding RICO
conspiracy. The narrower point is that the application of Reves to RICO
conspiracy helps address some of these concerns by requiring a more
individualized element of proof and benefiting the defendants most likely to
be otherwise prejudiced.
An additional reason that lower courts might regard Salinas with
concern relates to the rule it established. While the Supreme Court was
likely correct to hold that RICO conspiracy does not require that the
individual defendant personally agree to commit two predicate acts for the

276 See DRESSLER, supra note 214, at § 29.04[A].
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reasons stated above, by removing this restriction previously employed by
many jurisdictions, Salinas took the already alarmingly vague and formless
Courts
RICO conspiracy charge and further emptied it of content.
previously rejected an application of Reves to RICO conspiracy in a context
where the prosecution was still required to prove that each individual
defendant personally agreed to two predicate acts.27 7 The landscape has
Prior to Salinas, the Second Circuit, for example, held a
changed.
defendant could be guilty of conspiracy to commit RICO if he "embraced
the objective of the alleged conspiracy and agreed to commit two predicate
acts in furtherance thereof., 278 The court recognized the importance of this
tangible personal involvement requirement, stating, "The required nexus
between the defendant's acts and the RICO conspiracy thus protects the
defendant from being found guilty based on incidental or tenuous
association with the enterprise or its members. 2 79 With no component of
RICO conspiracy still present to link a defendant's cognizable personal acts
to the enterprise, there is a pressing need to define RICO conspiracy more
specifically to ensure that individual defendants are adequately
distinguishable from one another and punished for acts, not associations.2 80
In addition, it bears mention that often the only criminal "act" a
defendant will commit in this context is this conspiratorial agreement; it
would behoove courts, then, to define that act in a meaningful way. 8 1
Again, as described above, the application of Reves to RICO conspiracy
represents one way of establishing this personal connection to the activities
of the enterprise; a way seemingly compelled by the statutory language and
in tune with the congressional goals of RICO. Extending Reves to RICO
conspiracy, therefore, represents one means of resolving the eternal RICO
dilemma of how to reach insulated crime leaders, while not inadvertently
sweeping up all manner of lower-rung participants.28 2

277
278
279

See, e.g., United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 44; cf United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing

concerns involving dangers of guilt by association as reason for adopting requirement of
personal agreement); Miller, supra note 258, at 62 (criticizing the Salinas decision for
further diluting the already weak action requirements of RICO conspiracy).
280 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946).
281 Cf WAYNE R. LA FAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(d) (2d ed.

1986) (emphasizing the primacy of the agreement in conspiracy charges, as it determines
whether the requisite mental state, plurality, etc. is present); Lynch, supra note 21, at 934
(detailing the propriety of the deeply rooted American tradition that criminal charges be
linked to some culpable act).
282 See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing the
"recurring" RICO dilemma).
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When considering these questions, it helps to remember that many
RICO defendants will likely be guilty of other crimes. For instance in
Viola, defendant Formisano, a minor associate of the RICO enterprise, had
other criminal charges pending against him. 283 Courts should not worry that
by narrowing the scope of RICO conspiracy liability, they exculpate
culpable defendants. The more refined question they must consider is
whether a defendant's actions should bring him within the scope of the
special RICO statute and its harsh criminal and civil penalties. Although
there is an argument that RICO established new and separate substantive
offenses,284 many contend that it was primarily intended as a sentence
enhancer-a more powerful, more punitive tool for dealing with an
especially harmful manner of criminal.
What courts should ask in
considering the exclusion of certain defendants from the reach of RICO is
whether those defendants are truly part of the particular class deserving of
RICO's special brand of liability.
V. CONCLUSION

The failure of most courts to extend Reves to RICO conspiracy is not
the only barrier to a full realization of that opinion's intended limitations on
liability. The Supreme Court has done nothing to regulate or clarify the
manner in which Reves is applied by lower courts. As a result, many
circuits have strayed from a faithful application of the test, offering a broad
construction of "operation or management" that excludes virtually no
defendant. 285 This tendency reflects both the tireless efforts of private
litigants to extend RICO's harsh damages provisions to new contexts and
the hesitancy of judges to stand in the way of RICO criminal prosecutions.
When a defendant looks like a criminal, thanks to her commission of certain
petty crimes or association with certain particularly culpable actors, it
seems difficult for some courts to countenance excusing her from RICO
liability merely because she was not as deeply involved as other defendants
in the criminal enterprise. This problem is exacerbated by continuing
confusion over the purposes of RICO and an enthusiasm for extending it to
the criminal issues of the day (like professional malpractice or white collar

283 See Viola, 35 F.3d at 44.
284

See Lynch, supra note 21, at 939 (arguing that RICO clearly established a new

substantive crime).
285 See Disanto, supra note 144, at 1074 (finding that many lower courts fail to apply
Reves faithfully and that others do so only inconsistently). The First Circuit's decision in
United States v. Oreto, is a good example of how lower courts are extending liability, most
likely beyond the permissible bounds of Reves. See 37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994).
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crime), whether such an extension was originally intended by Congress or
not.
Even with the watered-down version employed by a few of the
circuits, however, certain outside defendants continue to be exempted from
RICO liability under Reves.2 86 This highlights the pressing need to ensure
that these individuals, whom Congress intended to be exempt from liability,
are not swept back up in RICO's punitive net via an improperly broad
construction of the conspiracy provision.
In sum, both Reves itself and hombook conspiracy law counsel in
favor of an extension of the Reves test to § 1962(d). Such an extension is
the only way to effectuate the congressionally intended affirmative limit on
liability and truly restrict RICO charges to those who control or operate
enterprises. In addition, hornbook conspiracy law bolsters the case because
it represents the only means to ensure that the illegal agreement actually
encompasses all the important elements of the substantive offense. The
extension also accords with Gebardi and the line of conspiracy cases that
reject the use of conspiracy to evade an affirmative legislative restriction on
substantive liability. Finally, especially in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Salinas, there are strong policy reasons for extending the Reves
test. In this context, applying Reves to RICO conspiracy strikes the
appropriate balance between the legislative intent to reach certain classes of
racketeer or organized crime leaders, while allowing some refuge for those
"small fish" associated with a RICO enterprise. With the Reves restriction,
RICO conspiracy still does a great deal of work as a separate provision and
is still entirely effective at its putative aims.
Most importantly, an extension of the Reves test provides additional
protection for individuals otherwise subject to the risk of guilt by
association. To put it lightly, RICO is a tricky statute, and there is a harsh
reality lurking behind RICO's complicated structure-huge criminal
penalties can be incurred for minimal conduct. While RICO can function as
an important tool for reaching the actions of organized crime syndicates or
halting the work of criminal gangs, it carries many hazards for defendants
that fall within its extensive reach. This is especially true of the RICO
conspiracy provision which, when predicated on conspiracy and without an
overt act requirement, comes as close to a thought (or more functionally, an
286
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associational) crime as any law currently enforced today. Many have
criticized the very idea of RICO conspiracy.2 87 Consequently, the slow
march of many courts towards emptying RICO conspiracy of all content
should be carefully considered in light of these concerns. Once again, when
facing these issues, an extension of Reves is one means of strengthening the
proof necessary for RICO conspiracy and appropriately limiting the
provision's reach. In sum, Reves helps resolve what the Seventh Circuit
identified as the key dilemma in interpreting RICO conspiracy-crafting an
interpretation sufficiently broad to reach criminal "ring leaders," but which
also excludes "fringe actors" from RICO's harsh punishments. Courts
should consider the importance and propriety of this extension.

287 See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 261, at 393 n.432 (criticizing the concept of RICO
conspiracy and noting the diverse and numerous groups that have recommended its repeal);
cf Lynch, supra note 21, at 954-55 (recommending no separate use of §§ 1962(c) and (d) for
illegitimate enterprises because the use contravenes his rule that all RICO defendants must
be linked to the enterprise via specific predicate acts).

